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COMMENTS
UCC SECTION 2-318: EFFECT ON WASHINGTON
REQUIREMENTS OF PRIVITY IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY SUITS
In recent years, there has been considerable development in the law
governing liability of a seller to persons other than his immediate buyer
for personal injuries caused by defective products.1 The rule of caveat
emptor has been progressively eroded.2 The majority of writers3 and
an increasing number of courts have adopted the position that a seller
cannot avoid liability on the ground that he is not in privity of contract
with the injured party.4 The Washington court appears to be following
this trend. The process of judicial development, however, may be
jeopardized by the recent enactment in Washington of section 2-318 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.5
Section 2-318 of the Code exempts specified parties from a privity
requirement which courts might otherwise require in breach of war-
ranty actions, providing:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
The class of possible warranty beneficiaries was not necessarily in-
tended by the Code drafters to be limited to those parties expressly
1 See, e.g., Jaeger, How Strict is the Manufacturer's Liability? Recent Develop-
nents, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 293 (1965); Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin
Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1963) ; Jaeger, Product Liability: The Construc-
tive W1arranty, 39 NoRE DAME LAW. 501 (1964) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Speidel,
The Virginia Anti-Privity Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965).
-See, e.g., Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133
(1931) .( See generally authorities cited supra note 1. Contra, Plant, Strict Liability of
Manufacturers For Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View,
24 TENN. L. REv. 938 (1957). Professor Plant based his argument on a Michigan
case; it is apparent, however, that his theory did not convince the Michigan court
which has recently adopted an extremely liberal strict liability approach. See text
accompanying note 35 infra.
"See, e.g., Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 66 Wn. 2d 187, 401 P.2d 844 (1965);
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.NV.2d 129 (1965); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Goldberg
v. Kollman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
&WAsH. Rx'. CODE fit. 62A (1965) (effective July 1, 1967). References to the
uniform commercial code, unless otherwise specified, will be to the 1962 Official
Draft. The code will hereinafter be cited as UCC.
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mentioned in the language of the section.6 However, it is possible that
section 2-318 in its present form might be interpreted as indicative of
legislative intent to restrict warranty protection exclusively to the
specified parties.7
Based on the conviction that the legislature did not intend passage
of section 2-318 to restrict warranty protections,8 this Note examines
possible interpretations and treatment in other jurisdictions and makes
a recommendation which would allow the Washington court freedom
to accept, reject, or modify a strict liability approach.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CODE SECTION 2-318
The 1950 draft of Code section 2-318 reads as follows:
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
A warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of the buyer or who is his guest [or
one whose relationship to him] is such as to make it reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section. (Brackets added.)
In explaining the objective sought, the commissioner said: 9
This section, following the dominant trend of judicial opinion devel-
oped in the light of modern distribution methods and the fact of group
consumption, is intended to broaden the right and the remedy of the
consumer in warranty, to free them from any technical rules as to
"privity" and to make them, insofar as feasible, directly enforceable
against the party ultimately responsible for any injury. It seeks to
accomplish this purpose without any derogation of any right or remedy
resting on negligence.
Additionally, the 1950 draft contained two allied provisions. One
allowed a buyer who resold goods to implead his immediate seller in
actions brought against the buyer."0 The other allowed direct action
'UCC § 2-318, comment 3: "[T]he section ... is not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells extend to other persons in the distributive chain."
'This possible interpretation is suggested in Cosway, Sales-A Cornparison of
the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WVAsH. L. REv.
617, 634 (1960). See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
' The legislative history is barren of any comment on or explanation of § 2-318.
This has not been the case in other jurisdictions which have enacted the section.
See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
'UCC (Spring 1950 Draft) comment 2.
oSection 2-718 of the 1950 draft read as follows:
Impleader by Buyer; Notice to Defend.
(1) Where a buyer resells and is sued for any breach with regard to which he
would have an action over against his seller he may
[ VtOT.. 42 :253
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against a prior seller for breach of warranty."
In 1952, this broad version of section 2-318 was altered by (1)
adding the qualifying word "seller" before "warranty,"'" (2) exclud-
ing, in essence, the above-bracketed portion of the statute, (3) deleting
the liberal commissioner's comment, and (4) eliminating the two allied
provisions.
The 1962 revisions expressly include as beneficiaries of warranties
the buyer's family, household, and guests. The 1962 draft of section
2-318 has arguably vitiated the purpose of the original Code drafters
to eliminate any privity problems in breach of warranty actions, and
has led some writers to suggest that section 2-318 be eliminated from
the Code altogether. 13
The restrictiveness of the present version of section 2-318 may be
more apparent than real. While the section expressly includes as
warranty beneficiaries the buyer's family, household, and guests, com-
ment three to section 2-318 continues:14
... Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given
to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain.
Comment three has encouraged most writers to conclude that section
2-318 does not restrict courts from eliminating privity when parties
other than those specifically mentioned in the section are involved.'
It is arguable, however, that the non-restrictive language of comment
three applies only to those persons in the "distributive chain" and is
(a) implead his seller in like manner and with like effect as is or may be
provided in the [Rules of Civil Procedure of this state] [Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure]; or
(b) seasonably notify to his seller to come in and defend the action.
(2) Failure of a seller to defend after receiving such notification renders any
adverse judgment in the action conclusive against him and makes him liable for
all costs of the action including reasonable attorney's fees.
"Section 2-719 of the 1950 draft read as follows :
Direct Action Against Prior Seller.
Damages for breach of a warranty sustained by the buyer or by any beneficiary
to whom the warranty extends (Section 2-318) may be recovered in a direct
action against the seller or any person subject to impleader under the preceding
section. An action against one warrantor does not of itself bar action against
another.
"
2 The substitution apparently reduces the scope of express warranty protection.
See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
'3 See, e.g., King, Suggested Changes in the Uniform Cmnercial Code-Sales,
33 ORE. L. REv. 113, 118 (1954).
"UCC § 2-318, comment 3.
See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 1, at 815-16.
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not intended to liberalize the privity requirements with regard to
persons outside the distributive chain.16 In order to assess these con-
flicting arguments, it is helpful to identify clearly the situation to which
section 2-318 is expressly applicable.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY SITUATIONS
Privity of contract is that connection or relationship which exists
between two or more contracting parties. To maintain an action on a
contract, there must be privity between plaintiff and defendant. When
a seller makes a warranty incident to a sales contract, his buyer is in
actual privity and therefore an action on the contract for breach of
warranty may be maintained. Frequently, however, a party other than
the immediate seller's buyer will claim that he too is entitled to war-
ranty protection. The various instances may be illustrated with the
help of the following:
A, a manufacturer of ranges, sells them to B, a wholesaler, who
resells them to C, a distributor, who resells them to D, a retailer.
D, the retailer, sells two gas ranges to X, a buyer who is in the
restaurant business. X puts one range in his restaurant, where his
employee, Y, is injured by an explosion caused by a defect in the
range. X places the other range in his home where his wife, Mrs.
X, is injured as the result of a similar defect. Z, who is walking
past X's home at the time of the blast, is also injured.
Assume each sale was accompanied by a warranty which would
permit recovery by any party in actual privity with another party.
(Thus, X could recover from D, D from C, and so forth.) The dis-
puted actions are suits by parties not in actual privity. For example,
may X, the retail purchaser, recover from A, the manufacturer? May
D, the retailer, recover from A, the manufacturer? May a party out-
side the distributive chain recover against a party in the distributive
chain, e.g., Mrs. X against D, C, B, or A? Section 2-318 provides
answers to some, but not all, of these questions.
The initial problem is, who qualifies as a "seller" and is therefore
expressly covered by section 2-318. Although not certain, it would
seem that a party is a "seller" only with reference to his immediate
" This position was taken by the Pennsylvania court in Hochgertel v. Canada
Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963). See text discussion accompanying note
22 infra.
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buyer.17 Thus for example, A would be a "seller" only to B. The
relationship of prime concern, of course, is that between the retail
buyer and the retailer (X and D). Section 2-318 permits an action
by the buyer's family members and guests against the buyers's seller.
(Mrs. X could recover from D.)
It should be emphasized that these are the only instances expressly
referred to by section 2-318. However, comment three refers to suits
by "persons in the distributive chain" against parties other than their
immediate seller.' The distributive chain seems to extend to the
ultimate purchaser and envisions suits, for example, by X against A
or by D against B. Comment three expressly takes a neutral position
as to a privity requirement in such cases, leaving the question to the
courts.
The following situations remain: (1) Suits by persons outside the
distributive chain, yet expressly mentioned in section 2-318, against
parties in the distributive chain above the retailer; e.g., Mrs. X against
A, B, or C; (2) suits by persons with some connection with the buyer,
but not expressly mentioned in section 2-318, against parties in the
distributive chain, e.g., Y, X's employee, against A, B, C, or D; and
(3) suits by persons with no connection with the buyer against parties
in the distributive chain, e.g., Z, the innocent bystander, against A,
B, C, or D. The Code makes no reference, in section 2-318 or else-
where, to these situations. The question arises as to the significance to
be accorded this legislative silence. Several positions are tenable.
Elimination of privity in some cases and neutrality in others may
indicate a general position of disfavor toward the requirement. Com-
ment three may leave the issue to the courts in the belief that the
judicial trend against privity will continue.'" Following this reasoning
section 2-318 may encourage, and certainly would not discourage
judicial elimination of privity in cases not covered by the section. On
the other hand, it is arguable that section 2-318 and comment three
are exceptions to an otherwise general rule that warranty actions may
be maintained only when the parties are in actual privity, or in other
27 See Speidel, supra note 1, at 815. A conceivable alternative construction would
be that the words "his buyer" encompass any party who may be expected to buy the
product in the normal course of distribution. This construction seems strained at
best and conflicts with the language of comment 3.
See note 14 supra and accompanying text
The UCC drafters, however, have recently reemphasized their neutrality towardjudicial abolition of privity. The Editorial Board refused to alter § 2-318 because
there was "no national consensus as to the scope of warranty protection which is
proper." PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORT
No. 2, at 39 (1965).
19661
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words, that privity is required by the negative implication of section
2-318 in cases where it has not been mentioned. A restrictive interpre-
tation on these grounds has been criticized as unnecessary and unwise21
but it has been made by at least one court.2
III. JUDICIAL REACTION TO SECTION 2-318
In Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.,2 2 the Pennsylvania court denied
recovery in an action against a manufacturer by an employee of a
purchaser who had been injured by an exploding bottle of soda water.
The court reasoned that an employee was not within any of the three
classes of persons specified in section 2-318 and the neutral position of
comment three offered no reason for extending protection. The court
stated that to allow an employee, who was a stranger to the contract,
to recover would make the manufacturer the guarantor of his products.
The Pennsylvania position is further illustrated by a recent decision
which treated cases involving injuries arising from consumption of
unfit food as exceptions from the general rule that privity is required
in warranty actions. 3
Hochgertel is of suspect precedential value. The only case cited in
the opinion in support of strict construction of section 2-318 was a
Connecticut decision which held that a maid was not a member of the
buyer's household and therefore could not recover.24 However, a more
recent Connecticut decision allowed recovery from a manufacturer by
an employee (service station attendant) despite lack of privity with the
manufacturer.2 5 In addition, the Connecticut court has allowed re-
covery from a manufacturer by a retail buyer,26 indicating that the
situations referred to in comment three are open to judicial elimination
of privity.
Pennsylvania itself has recently taken a markedly different approach
to products liability suits. In Webb v. Zern27 the court permitted
plaintiff to recover from a beer distributor for injuries caused by an
exploding beer keg. Plaintiff's father had purchased the keg from the
See Cosway, supra note 7, at 635.
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
2 Ibid.
Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., Inc., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964).
Duart v. Axton-Cross Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 188, 110 A2d 647 (1954). At this
time Connecticut had a statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 2160C (Supp. 1953), with
provisions exactly like § 2-318.
Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Super. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963).
" Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Super. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963); Hamon
v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1960).
7422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
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defendant and therefore the facts of the case fell squarely under the
members-of-the-family language of section 2-318. The court, however,
did not base recovery on sales warranty theory. Instead, the majority
adopted as the common law of Pennsylvania the strict liability doctrine
as expressed in section 402A of the Restatement (Second), Torts."
This approach makes breach of warranty actions in personal injury
cases unnecessary and effectively nullifies Hochgertel. Implicit in the
decision is rejection of the argument that, by placing section 2-318
after the Code warranty provisions, the legislature intended all per-
sonal injury suits to be resolved within the Code framework.2 9
The Hochgertel approach to privity is a minority position. Exam-
ination of other jurisdictions reveals a general trend toward elimination
of a privity requirement in cases not covered by section 2-318. In
Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.," a pre-Code case, the New
Jersey court permitted recovery from a seller and manufacturer by a
member of a buyer's family. When New Jersey passed the Code, the
drafters noted in the comment that Henningson was within the specific
language of section 2-318.31 While this reference might be interpreted
as a limitation on using Henningson as a precedent in cases not within
section 2-318, the New Jersey court has not felt itself so restricted. In
a case which arose prior to the Code's effective date but was heard after
RESTATE=MENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965) reads as follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if(a the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in
this Section may not apply (1) to harm to persons other than users and con-
sumers; (2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or otherwise sub-
stantially changed before it reaches the user or consumer; or (3) to the seller of
a component part of a product to be assembled.
The Pennsylvania Court flatly stated: "Ve hereby adopt the foregoing language as
the law of Pennsylvania." 220 A.2d at 854.
'The advantages and disadvantages of dealing with products liability actions
within the Code framework are discussed in Prosser, .Pra note 1, at 1127-34. See
text accompanying notes 58-69 infra.
- 32 N.J. 338, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), 46 CORNELL L.Q. 607 (1961), 74 HAv. L. REv.
630 (1961), 59 fcH. L. Rsv. 467 (1961) (wife of purchaser of automobile recovered
in a suit against the manufacturer).
I N.J. Rxv. STAT. § 12A: 2-318 (Supp. 1961), comment 1.
19661]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
enactment, the court allowed recovery from a seller by a child of the
buyer's lessee. 2 And, in a case which arose after the Code became
effective, defendant rental agency was held strictly liable for breach of
implied warranty to the driver of a truck leased by his employer."3
The cases exemplify the trend toward allowing recovery by employees
on the ground that they are foreseeable users of products purchased by
their employers. Obviously, recovery would have been denied had the
court felt itself restricted by section 2-318.
Adoption of the Code in Michigan presented a somewhat different
problem. Prior to the Code, several decisions had abandoned a privity
requirement in limited circumstances. 4 Finally, in Piercefield v. Rem-
ington Arms Co.,35 the court allowed an injured bystander to bring an
action against a manufacturer of defective shotgun shells." Piercefield
clearly goes beyond section 2-318, yet the legislature in subsequently
passing the Code, gave no indication that the decision was affected.
Legislative silence in this instance may indicate approval of judicial
freedom to develop case law where section 2-318 is inapplicable?
The problem posed by section 2-318 has been explicitly recognized
in the District of Columbia. In Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors
Corp.,3" the court allowed recovery by a buyer from an automobile
manufacturer. Defendant manufacturer contended that the Code had
codified the doctrine of privity and that any change must be by further
legislation. In rejecting this argument, the court stated, "the Uniform
Commercial Code ... expressly leaves questions concerning privity to
the judiciary,"3 and cited section 2-318 and comment three. The
suit was between parties in the distributive chain and therefore the
language could be construed as dictum as to cases not referred to in
section 2-318 or comment three. However, it seems more likely that
these cases would also be open to judicial development.
" Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), 41 WAsH.
L. REv. 166 (1966). The court also cited its own previous opinion which had
adopted the tort theory of implied warranty, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.,
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
' Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965), discussed in Note, 41 WASH. L. Rzv. 166, 172 (1966). The court found
support for its conclusion in the comments to the Code. See N.J. REv. STAT. §
12A: 2-318 (1962), comment at p. 190 n2.
' See cases cited in Note, 41 WASH. L. REv. 161, 162 n.12 (1966).
375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), 25 MD. L. REv. 267 (1965), 41 WASH.
L. REv. 161 (1966).
" Contra, Rodrigues v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. App. 1963)(refused to extend warranty to a bystander).
'But see Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California
Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 281,283 (1961).
's185 A.2d 919 (Munic. Ct. App. Wash. D.C. 1962), 5 ARiz. L. REv. 306 (1964).
[ VOL. 42: 253
COMMENTS
The majority of courts seemingly do not regard section 2-318 as a
restraint on judicial resolution of the privity issue in warranty actions
and it is entirely conceivable that the Washington court would likewise
take this position. Nonetheless, the danger of a restrictive approach,
such as that taken in Hochgertel, should not be overlooked. In fact,
the uncertainties raised by the Code have prompted several jurisdic-
tions to take additional legislative steps to deal with privity problems.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Ten states have enacted changes affecting section 2-318.40 Three
basic approaches have evolved: (1) complete omission or repeal;
(2) relatively minor changes in the language; (3) omission or repeal
followed by substitution of the state's version of an anti-privity statute.
A. Omission or Repeal
California and Utah purposely omitted section 2-318 when they
enacted the Code in 1963 and 1965, respectively.4' California's legis-
lature followed the suggestions of its Commercial Code commentators
who had recommended deletion.42 A prior California decision had
permitted recovery from a manufacturer by a buyer's employee, re-
jecting the defense of lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant.43
There was fear that passage of the Code following the decision might
indicate disfavor with the result.44 Similar reasoning may explain
Utah's omission of the section." Washington could accomplish the
same result by repealing section 2-318 before it becomes effective.
B. Minor Changes in Section 2-318
Arkansas" and Connecticut47 have made limited changes designed to
endorse particular decisions. Arkansas expressly eliminated a privity
requirement in suits against manufacturers." The change does not
"185 A.2d at 922-23.
California, Utah, Virginia, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado, Alabama, South
Dakota, Wyoming, and Texas have all changed § 2-318 in some form.
"CAL. COMM. CODE § 2318; UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-318 (1965).
' CAL. COMM. CODE § 2318; BOHN & WILLIAMS, CALIFORNIA CODE COMMENTS
(1963).
, Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
"See FACT FINDING COMM. ON JUDIcIARY, SENATE OF THE STATE OF CAL.
SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, (Part I-The Uniform Commercial
Code) 457-58 (1961).
" The reasons for Utah's omission of § 2-318 are somewhat more obscure, as the
annotations of the former decisions are not due to be published until 1967.
" Ark. Acts 1965, No. 35.
' CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 42A-2-318 (1961).
dsIn Arkansas, one case had already gone beyond § 2-318. Delta Oxygen Co. v.
Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964).
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answer such questions as whether an employee may maintain an action
or whether a landlord-tenant situation is covered by section 2-318.41
Additional amendments may be needed if a piecemeal approach is
taken. Connecticut's statute is even less effective, merely codifying
comment three to section 2-318.10 Although the official comments are
not part of the Code as enacted, their content is sufficiently persuasive
without enactment into law. The Connecticut solution is fraught with
the same difficulties as the Arkansas approach-leaving unanswered
questions which can only be resolved by additional legislation. The
potential disadvantage of continual revision of section 2-318 is the
possibility that a court will exempt from the privity requirements only
those parties specifically mentioned in the language of the section,
although the latter criticism may not be relevant to the Connecticut
neutrality amendment.
C. Replacement of Section 2-318 with an Anti-Privity Statute
The third alternative legislative action utilizes a state's own legisla-
tion to replace section 2-318. A substitute statute differs from the
California-Utah approach which merely omits section 2-318. Although
the apparent objective of both approaches is to permit courts to
broaden the scope of warranty protection, the procedures in reaching
that result may be quite different; Virginia resolves warranty problems
under the Code, whereas California resolves them without reference to
the Code. Variations of anti-privity statutes to replace the standard
section 2-318 are found in Virginia, Colorado, Alabama, South Dakota,
Wyoming, and Texas.
The Virginia 5' and Colorado52 statutes state that lack of privity is
not a defense in a suit for breach of warranty brought against a manu-
facturer or seller of goods. 3 Alabama, 4 South Dakota, " and Wyo-
'9 For a similar problem in Washington, see Fuhrman v. Interior Warehouse
Co., 64 Wash. 159, 116 Pac. 666 (1911), discussed in Cosway, Sales-A Comparison
of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WASH. L. RE%.
617, 634 n.70 (1960).
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 42A-2-318 (1961).
' VA. CODE ANN. § 8. 2-318 (1965).
1 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-2-318 (1965). For a case which probably prompted
such a change, see Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964), discussed in
Note, 41 WASH. L. REv. 166, 169-70 (1966).
' For a comprehensive study of the Virginia anti-privity statute, see Speidel,
supra note 1. See also Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in
Products Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. Rxv. 982 (1962); Keeton, Products Liaility-
Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675 (1963).
r' A.A. CODE ANN. tit. 7A, § 2-318 (1966).
t S.D. CODE § 2-318 (1966).
[ VOL. 42 : 253
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ming5" reach the same result in more positive terms. The phrasing of
these three statutes is similar to the 1950 version of section 2-318
which exempted from the privity requirement persons who could rea-
sonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods.
Although the result of this type statute is the same as the Virginia-
Colorado approach, there appears to be more flexibility for a court
under the Alabama-Wyoming type statute to handle the warranty
problems entirely outside the Code, using section 2-318 solely as a
definitional section of the parties exempted from a privity requirement.
As yet there is no case authority with which to support such a predic-
tion. The Texas legislature was much more non-committal.17 The
Texas version of section 2-318 does not take any stand on whether or
not privity is required against a manufacturer or retailer.
If the trend away from a privity requirement is in effect a trend
toward strict liability, it is necessary to take a closer look at the
Virginia-Colorado approach because it is one of the means by which to
reach a strict liability result. There may be substantial differences in
handling a strict liability problem under section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second), Torts5 8 (California's approach to strict liability by
omitting section 2-318), and handling the same problem within the
confines of the Code (Virginia's anti-privity statute answer to strict
liability). A thorough comparison of these two approaches was made
by Professor Speidel who concluded that Virginia's anti-privity statute
provided more flexibility than a rigid application of section 402A. 9
His entire discussion, however, assumes that a court following the
California approach will strictly adhere to the principles set forth in
section 402A, which may not necessarily be true. It would appear that
if the concept of strict liability is left in the hands of the courts, as it
is under the California approach, courts would be free to mold the
strict liability concept to fulfill their objective of adequate consumer
protection without overburdening the manufacturer. Under the Vir-
ginia statute, however, warranty problems must be solved within the
' Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-318 (Supp. 1965). Wyoming's statute is similar to that
of Alabama and South Dakota and provides as follows: "A seller's warranty
whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of warranty."
Compare the 1950 draft of § 2-718 in text accompanying note 9 supra.
I TEX. Rxv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 2-318 (1965).
' See Note 28 supra.
"See Speidel, The Virginia Anti-Privty Statute: Strict Products Liability
Under the Uniform Cominercial Code, 51 VA. L. Ray. 804, 818-52 (1965).
'Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1127 (1960).
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confines of the Code with its notice requirements and liberal allowance
for disclaimers of liability by the manufacturer, both of which con-
siderably restrict the extension of strict liability.
Dean Prosser suggests that the major advantage of handling privity
problems outside the Code is avoiding the use of intricacies of sales
and contract law to solve what is essentially a problem in tort.", Al-
though Professor Speidel sees no major objections to handling these
warranty problems within the Code, a recent federal case isolates the
difficulties that can arise under such an approach: "[Strict liability
under section 402A] is hardly more than what exists under implied
warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer,
requirements of notice of defect, and limitation through inconsistencies
with express warranties."'" Each of these concepts limits a consumer's
remedy for a seller's breach of warranty and is inconsistent with strict
liability which attempts to broaden the liability of a manufacturer of
defective products.
The requirement of notice to the defendant in a breach of warranty
action under the Code" was intended to liberalize the notice require-
ment to protect the non-commercial buyers who would not be expected
to know such technicalities. 3 This provision has not yet been inter-
preted, however, and may yet prove to be a barrier to recovery under
the Code by third parties who fail to give notice to the manufacturer of
the defect which caused their injury.
If these problems are handled within the confines of the Code,
another possible limitation on the liability of the manufacturer for
breach of warranty will be the disclaimer provisions of section 2-316
and the limitation of remedies provisions of section 2-719 of the Code.
The disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability under
section 2-316(2) is limited only by the fact that the seller must put
disclaimer language which mentions "merchantability" in the contract,
and if the contract is in writing, the language must be "conspicuous."
No express assent by the buyer is required.64 Possibly this limitation
under the Code may be discounted on the ground that to be effective,
Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
IUCC §2-607(3) (a) provides: "IT]he buyer must within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach
or be barred from any remedy ... .
See UCC § 2-607, comment 5.
" There is an additional possibility that such an agreement will be struck down
for "unconscionability" if the disclaimer is unreasonable. UCC §2-302(1). For a
recent case interpreting "unconscionability" see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 41 WASH. L. REv. 621 (1966).
[ VOL. 42 : 253
COMMENTS
the disclaimer must involve the contracting parties, and consequently
the disclaimer will not affect remote parties suing in breach of war-
ranty. There has been insufficient case interpretation on this point to
confidently predict such a result6 5 More importantly, a comment to
section 2-318 expressly allows a disclaimer of warranty to which the
buyer agrees to bind the third party beneficiaries. 6 The problem of
disclaimers would not be present outside the Code under the California
approach because section 402A strictly prohibits any disclaimer of
strict liability.17
A second distinguishable area between the Virginia approach and
the California approach to strict liability is the type of defect which
must be present in order to recover for a breach of warranty. Under
the Code, there must be "unmerchantable goods" which proximately
cause the loss,6 s while under section 402A the defect which causes the
injury must be "unreasonably dangerous.) 69
V. PRESENT WASHINGTON LAW
Having considered the reaction to section 2-318 in other jurisdic-
tions, it is now pertinent to analyze the Washington court's treatment
of products liability suits.
Mazetti v. Armour0 is one of the most significant early cases per-
mitting recovery despite lack of privity between plaintiff and defen-
dant. A restaurant lessee was awarded lost profits from a manufacturer
who had supplied spoiled beef. The court stated that privity was
generally required in actions for breach of implied warranty but that
there were recognized exceptions "where the thing causing the injury
is of a noxious or dangerous kind."'" Subsequent cases have made it
'For a good discussion on disclaimer problems, see Cudahy, Limitation of
Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 MARQ. L. Rlv. 126 (1963).
His analysis, however, does not consider the effect of a disclaimer on parties not in
privity with each other.
' UCC § 2-318, comment 1. Disclaimer provisions have been in general disfavor
with the Washington court in breach of warranty actions. See cases collected in
Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Coln-
mercial Code, 35 WASH. L. Ryv. 617, 630-31 (1960).
11 RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965).
UCC § 2-314(2).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). Professor Speidel notes that
either approach could produce consistent results if uniformly applied. Speidel,
supra note 59, at 816. Significantly, however, Washington appears to be approaching
the problem through defining what products are "unreasonably dangerous." In
Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wn. 2d 720, 725, 393 P.2d 936, 938-39 (1964), the
court stated that "'inherently and imminently dangerous' to human safety ... means
nothing more than that substantial harm is to be anticipated if the chattel is
defective."
o75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
Id. at 624, 135 Pac. at 634.
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clear that a manufacturer is strictly liable for injuries caused by un-
wholesome food to all parties who may be expected to consume the
goods.72
Mazetti is somewhat unique in that the plaintiff was suing for
economic injury. The more common situation is suit by the personally
injured retail purchaser against the manufacturer-the situations re-
ferred to in comment three to section 2-318. In these cases, the court
has distinguished between express and implied warranties. Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co.73 is one of the leading cases in the country allowing a
consumer to recover from a manufacturer for breach of express war-
ranties made in advertisements. Although the opinion is not altogether
clear, the court seemed to reason that privity is not a requirement in
actions on express warranties by parties who relied on the advertise-
ments.74 However, this reasoning has been circumvented in later cases
which instead create a fictional contractual relationship between man-
ufacturer and consumer75 or treat the consumer as a third party
beneficiary of the sale contract between manufacturer and retailer.76
Three Washington cases contain statements to the effect that privity
is a prerequisite to recovery.77  It has been argued, however, that
all three are distinguishable on other grounds, and that therefore it
would be possible for the court to eliminate privity requirements with-
"'See e.g., LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wn. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421
(1957) (manufacturer held liable to consumer's wife for foreign substance found
in a bottle of coke); Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wn. 2d 1, 132 P.2d
740 (1942) (court stated in dictum that a salmon canner would have been held liable
to the consumer had the consumer plaintiff proved his sickness was caused by the
unwholesome fish) ; Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wn. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 76
(1940) (in dictum the court stated the dairy farmer supplying the milk would have
been held liable had there been proof the impure milk came from his farm). This
concept was extended to include products obviously intended for use on the body.
See, e.g., Martin v. J. C .Penney Co., 50 Wn. 2d 560, 313 P2d 689 (1956)
(allowed recovery to one not in privity who was injured by a burning shirt);
Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952 ) (plaintiff not in
privity allowed to sue for injuries sustained from a flammable robe).
"168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
' See discussion of case in Comment, Prizity; Property Damnage; and Personal
Injuries-A Re-Appraisal, 32 WASH. L. REv. 153, 155 (1957).
'In Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wn. 2d 760, 289 P2d 1015 (1955), the retailer was
held to be the consumer's agent to buy pipe from the manufacturer. This exception
is discussed in Gillam, Judicial Legislation, Legal Fictions, and Products Liability:
The Agency Theory, 37 Oax. L. REv. 217, 223 (1958). See also Wisdom v. Morris
Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1929), where the court held the retailer
was the manufacturer's agent to sell.
"'Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wn. 2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952), discussed in Comment,
supra note 74, at 157. This approach is not unknown in other jurisdictions. See
McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962) ; Greenberg v.
Lorenz, 213 N.Y.S. 2d 39, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
'Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wn. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946);
Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945) ; Kramer v. Carbolineum
Wood Preserving Co., 105 Wash. 401, 177 Pac. 771 (1919).
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out overruling a single express warranty case.78 It is also significant
that two of the cases denying recovery involved defendants who were
merely distributors in the chain of marketing and were not deemed to
have adopted the express warranty on the label of the defective goods. 79
Dictum in a recent Washington case supports the theory that Washing-
ton will take a liberal attitude in dealing with the express warranty
suits against the manufacturer. The court said in Fines v. West Side
Implement Co: 0
We have indicated that the time is coming, and now is (at least
under certain circumstances), when manufacturers are to be held
responsible to those damaged by reliance on their false and mis-
leading advertising, even though there be no privity of contract.
[Citing cases.]
A privity requirement has more support in Washington in the area
of implied warranty. Beginning with Mazetti the food cases have been
blocked out as an exception to the normal privity rules, placing strict
liability upon manufacturers of unwholesome food products.,, Similar
is the recent case, Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co.,"2 which allowed recovery
for injuries caused by products used on the skin or scalp which con-
tain irritants.
However, several cases support a privity requirement in actions on
implied warranties against a manufacturer. Cochran v. McDonalds3
seems to squarely support the rule that privity of contract is required
in implied warranty cases, and at least two other cases8 4 have strong
language indicating support of the Cochran holding. It has been sug-
gested, however, that to abolish privity as a requirement in the im-
plied warranty cases in Washington would only necessitate overruling
Cochran."5
Until recently, the Washington court has not been squarely faced
with the issue of privity with regard to non-purchasing beneficiaries of
the buyer-the situation expressly covered by section 2-318. Professor
7 Comment, supra note 74, at 158.
Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945); Kramer v.
Carbolineum Wood Preserving Co., 105 Wash. 401, 177 Pac. 771 (1919).
'56 Wn. 2d 304, 311, 352 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1960).
' See cases cited note 72 supra.
'61 Wn. 2d 347, 378 P2d 298 (1963).
'23 Wn. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
'Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wn. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946);
Fleenor v. Erickson, 35 Wn. 2d 891, 215 P.2d 885 (1950).
"'See Comment, supra note 74, at 160.
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Cosway has collected cases which have impliedly recognized liability
of the seller to members of the purchaser's family, but suggests that the
court was not cognizant of a privity problem in any of the cases cited."
Additional problems are raised in other Washington cases which ap-
parently are not covered under the language of section 2-318. For
example, does a seller's warranty liability to guests in a "home" extend
to automobile passenger guests?87 It is only speculation how the
Washington court would treat such problems under section 2-318, but
later cases indicate a liberal attitude which might allow recovery in
spite of lack of privity.8 s
The problem posed by the injured bystander situation is illustrated
in Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat, Inc.89 A dangerous mixture of pro-
pane gas, which defendant had sold to a third party, exploded and
wrecked plaintiff's cafe which stood two hundred feet away from the
third party's place of business. The court refused to allow a suit by
plaintiff stating that in order "for there to be recovery on a breach of
an implied warranty, the plaintiff must have bought something from
somebody."9 0
Whatever conclusions are drawn from the preceding cases, two re-
cent decisions indicate a definite move in Washington toward manu-
facturer's strict liability for having furnished inherently dangerous
products. In Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen,9 1 defendant Salamonsen
built a house and installed a sliding glass door which had been pur-
chased from defendant manufacturer, Northwest Hardware, Inc. Sal-
amonsen sold the house to the McClanes who were not parties to the
action. Plaintiff, a ten-year-old guest in the McClane's home, sus-
tained injuries when he crashed through the glass door. Relying upon
two sections from the Restatement (Second), Torts,92 the court
concluded that Salamonsen, who had sold the land with a house on it,
had no reason to know of the dangerous condition of the glass door, and
could not be held liable for a breach of warranty. However, with
respect to the liability of defendant North Hardware, Inc., the court
stated: 93
s' Cosway, supra note 66, at 634.
' This question is raised by Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255
Pac. 939 (1927).
s See text accompanying notes 92-99 infra.
60 Wn. 2d 468, 374 P2d 549 (1962).
Id. at 475, 374 P.2d at 553.
64 Wn. 2d 720, 393 P.2d 936 (1964).
92 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 352, 353 (1965).
64 Wn. 2d at 722-23, 393 P.2d at 937.
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The seller's warranty is a curious hybrid of tort and contract. Prosser,
Law of Torts (2d ed.) § 83, p. 493. It has not lost its original tort
character. We recognized this in Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wn.
(2d) 347, 378 P.(2d) 298 (1963), and LaHue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc.,
50 Wn. (2d) 645, 314 P.(2d) 421 (1957). Of course, if breach of actual
representations can be proved and there is privity of parties, the action
may be in contract; but primarily, a manufacturer's liability for having
furnished an inherently dangerous product to the public sounds in tort.
That the action is a product of the common-law decisions has been rec-
ognized in a variety of situations. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.(2) 897 (1962) and cases cited. [Em-
phasis added.]
It is extremely significant that the Washington court chose to cite
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc." In Greenman an action was
brought against both the manufacturer and the seller of a home work-
shop machine in negligence and express warranty, the latter being
representations in advertisements on the machine. The court held the
manufacturer strictly liable for injuries resulting from the defective
equipment. The court noted that these so-called warranties involved
in previous products liability cases were not imposed by the sales act,
but were a product of common law decisions. The effect of Greenman
was to remove privity, notice requirements, and contractual provisions
as possible barriers to suits by consumers against a manufacturer.
The California position on strict liability was strengthened in Justice
Traynor's subsequent decision in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,95
in which a manufacturer and retailer were held strictly liable in tort
for injuries sustained by a passenger when the allegedly defective
automobile in which she was riding left the road. The language quoted
from Dipangrazio appears consistent with the Greenman-Vandermark
approach in California.
The second recent Washington case dealing with privity in implied
warranty cases in Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co. 6 The court was not
forced to examine closely the privity concepts because the product
o, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
37 Cal. Rep. 896, 39 P.2d 198 (1964). A manufacturer and retailer were held
strictly liable in tort for injuries sustained by a passenger when the allegedly
defective automobile in which she was riding left the road. For a comprehensive
discussion of Greennan and Vaidermark, see Lascher, Strict Liability inr Tort for
Defective Products: 77ze Road To and Past Vanderinark, 38 So. CAL. L REV. 30
(1965). For a recent discussion of the California position, see Traynor, The Ways
and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENx. L. Rv. 363
(1965).
u66 NVn. 2d 187, 401 P.2d 844 (1965).
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involved, dynamite, fitted neatly into an established category of ex-
ceptions for inherently dangerous products. Yet, the court recognized
its "continuing trend away from the privity rule in warranty cases."
'17
Significantly, the court again discussed Greenman and strongly re-
affirmed a suggestion made in an earlier case 8 that a searching review
of the privity rules was needed in Washington. It is also notable that
the court viewed an employee in Brewer as a "user or consumer."
Thus the case goes beyond the categories enumerated in section 2-
318.99
The Washington cases, particularly Dipangrazio and Brewer, indi-
cate that the Washington court is following the general trend toward
viewing warranty actions as sounding primarily in tort and conse-
quently eliminating the privity requirement in products liability cases.
It is submitted that this is a salutary development. However, there
is room for disagreement as to scope of recovery in such action. The
competing arguments should be resolved by the courts on a case-by-
case basis. To the extent that section 2-318 may interfere with this
flexibility, it is of questionable merit.
VI. PROPOSED WASHINGTON SOLUTION
There are four alternatives open to the Washington legislature to
resolve the problems posed by section 2-318: (1) retain section 2-318
in its present form, trusting the Washington court to construe the
section as it sees fit; (2) adopt an anti-privity statute to replace
section 2-318; (3) revise the language of section 2-318 to accord with
the present Washington case law position on privity; or (4) repeal
section 2-318 without replacement legislation.
The first alternative, leaving section 2-318 in its present form, would
appear inadvisable. Washington already has a recent case which goes
beyond the language of section 2-318 in allowing recovery to an em-
ployee of the purchaser of a defective product. °00 To leave section
2-318 in its present form might be interpreted by the Washington
'r Id. at 192, 401 P.2d at 847.
Freeman v. Navarre, 46 Wn. 2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955).
The California experience provides an interesting parallel. At the time the
UCC was enacted, California already had a case on the books which had allowed an
employee recovery without requiring privity with the manufacturer. The com-
mentators to § 2-318 recognized enactment of this section as a backward step from
eliminating privity requirements because § 2-318 does not mention employees. It
was subsequent to the enactment of the UCC in California without § 2-318 that
Justice Traynor, unrestricted by this privity section, handed down his decisions in
Greenman and mandermark which paved the way for strict liability in California.
"
0
o Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 66 Wn. 2d 187, 401 P2d 844 (1965).
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court as legislative endorsement of a general privity requirement sub-
ject to only those specific exceptions enumerated in section 2-318.
The second alternative is enactment of an anti-privity statute along
the lines of Virginia's, which would force the Washington court to
handle the warranty problems under the provisions of the Code. Al-
though such an approach has numerous advantages,'0 ' its disadvan-
tages (allowing disclaimers and requiring notice) suggest it might
create more problems than it would solve.
The third alternative, revision of the language of section 2-318, is a
logical, though conservative, solution. Revision should not be on a
piecemeal basis which merely exempts certain parties from the privity
requirements. Rather, a more generous statement should be made as
to what parties are covered. The words "who is in the family or house-
hold of his buyer or who is a guest in his home" might be deleted from
section 2-318. This revised version does not require courts to handle
warranty problems under the Code with its notice and disclaimer
drawbacks. Rather, the revision would merely define a general class
of persons which is likely to be protected in the event of a breach of
warranty. If the Washington court decides to adopt strict liability in
non-food cases, this statute would still provide a useful guideline as to
potential plaintiffs in such actions. The suggested revision should not
suggest a limit on the class protected. Comment three to section 2-318
would provide additional leverage if the Washington court felt its
progress limited by this version. Even a bystander could conceivably
recover' if it was reasonable to foresee he might be affected by the
defective product. The revision would not radically change present
Washington law.
The final alternative, repeal of section 2-318, is recommended by its
straight-forward approach to the problem of abandonment of privity.
In addition, this solution comes closest to the California position after
which the Washington court appears to be patterning itself. The pri-
mary advantage would be handling of products liability cases outside
the code.
The third and fourth alternatives seem preferable to the first or
second. As noted before, the third alternative, revision of section
"I See Speidel, The Virginia Auti-Privity Statute: Strict Products Liability
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. R~v. 804 (1965). See also Lascher,
Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark,
38 So. CAL. L. REv. 30 (1965).
"" See Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965),
discussed in text accompanying note 35 supra.
1966 ] COMM.ENTS
272 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 42:253
2-318, is a conservative approach, and in a jurisdiction like Washington
which has shown a definite trend towards strict liability, it is seriously
doubted that a provision like section 2-3 18 in any form can be anything
but a hindrance to developing case law. The section's primary func-
tion, to provide legislative guidelines in the privity area, would be of
little value if the Washington Court decides to adopt strict liability
even in non-food warranty actions. Thus, it is suggested that the
Washington legislature repeal section 2-318.
